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Abstract 
As well as marking 60 years since the signature of the Treaty of Rome, 2017 will see the 10th 
Presidential election of France’s 5th Republic. The overlap between the question of Europe 
and the election to France’s highest office provides the framework for this article to explore 
the development of the European debate in France.  
Prior to 2012, and despite the increasing and undeniable salience of it for French domestic 
concerns, the question of Europe is widely considered to have been a secondary issue in 
Presidential elections. Focussing in particular on the period since the pivotal debate and 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty and the intervening transition from ‘permissive 
consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’, this article will explain how and why Europe has 
seemingly defied logic to remain on the margins of successive election campaigns before 
presenting the 2012 Presidential elections as a game-changer on how the question of Europe 
featured. The conclusion offers a discussion on the ramifications for future Presidential 
elections, starting with that of 2017.  
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Introduction 
In the 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the European project has become a 
central influence on French politics and society. Despite evidence of consistent general 
support, there has been increasing scepticism as sacrifices and negative consequences have 
become inevitable (Milner 2000, 35-58). One would therefore be forgiven for assuming that 
the intervening period would have witnessed an elevation of the question of Europe to a 
crucial election issue. However, and as will be discussed in greater detail below, ‘Europe has 
long been absent from French national electoral contests’ (Dehousse and Tacea 2015, 152). 
Whilst opposition to Europe has been mounting, the political translation of it has been 
reserved to marginal and extreme elements. The dominant centre-Right/centre-Left forces 
have shared a consensus on the fundamental advancement of the EU project (Drake 2013, 
127-8). As a result, Europe dominated by a ‘rhetoric of unanimity’ (Rozenberg 2011), has 
never really been an issue with enough leverage to see it brought in from the margins of 
successive presidential campaigns. The strange set of circumstances that has seen the 
increasingly important issue of Europe astutely avoided has enabled analyses of its presence 
in elections campaigns to be described as ‘invisible mais omniprésente’ (Belot and Cautrès 
2004, 119-41). 
This article begins by shedding some light on how this paradoxical set of 
circumstances has emerged, with the 1995 Presidential elections as the logical starting point. 
Up until then, there had been little or no consultation between the political elite and the 
general population on this question. The belief, commonly described as the ‘permissive 
consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), was that widespread acceptance of the European 
project characterised the general view of the French (and general EU) population with much 
support for the French lead on its development and progression (Schmidt 2007, 999-1001). 
However, François Mitterrand’s decision to ratify the Maastricht Treaty via a referendum in 
1992 cast doubt on this assumption and revealed how the European question was far from 
consensual (Drake 2008, 197-98; Flood 2005, 43; Hurrelmann 2007, 352). The post-
Maastricht era would see the ‘permissive consensus’ replaced by what has been described as 
a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2008). Europe, it is argued, has since then 
featured much more prominently on national political agendas as it has moved away from its 
status as the preserve of the mainstream elite. Despite this shift, the European question 
appears to have remained no more than an issue of secondary concern in successive election 
campaigns to France’s highest office. The three Presidential elections of 1995, 2002 and 2007 
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will be briefly analysed to demonstrate and explain how this period saw the European issue 
become an increasingly important, difficult, yet hidden, campaign theme. 2012 is then 
presented as a game-changing election signalling an important shift in how Europe featured. 
It will be concluded that Europe is now here to stay as a prominent issue in Presidential 
election campaigns, reflecting its position as an unavoidable area of importance. The article 
will draw on material from speeches, manifestos, media appearances and polling data.  
 
1995-2007: The European Elephant 
The 1995 elections were not only significant because they would turn the page on the 
Mitterrand era. They were equally the first post-Maastricht Presidential elections. This was 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, the successful ratification of the Maastricht treaty and its 
overwhelming backing by the bulk of France’s mainstream politicians marked a significant 
step forward for the European project. As a result, the presence of Europe was set to weigh 
more heavily in the lives of the entire French population for years to come (Johnson 1997, 
260-1). Secondly, despite OUI victory, the referendum sparked considerable debate in France 
and exposed clear divisions over the issue amongst the electorate as well as within and 
between political parties (Rozenberg 2011; Milner 2000, 35-6). One would therefore have 
been forgiven for assuming that Europe’s prominence as an election theme would increase 
accordingly. However, an examination of the 1995 campaign reveals that this did not 
materialise, with a ‘conspicuous absence of a serious discussion on Europe’ (Mazey 1995, 
146; Ross 2000, 96-97; Flood 2005, 58) amongst candidates and only secondary importance 
afforded the issue in opinion polls.1 This paradoxical set of circumstances can be explained 
by the fact that the growing doubts and fears, as exposed by the Maastricht referendum 
debate, coupled with the continued consensus amongst the mainstream political elite over the 
advancement of the European project (Tiersky 1995, 116-19) meant that the interests of the 
main candidates were best served by avoiding this difficult issue.  
By the time of the 2002 Presidential elections, the progress of the European project 
had continued unabated, perhaps most symbolically represented with the introduction of the 
Euro in January of the election year. With such developments came increasing doubts, fears 
and mounting Euroscepticism (Flood 2005, 42-63). Whilst President Chirac undoubtedly 
picked up the pro-European baton from his predecessor, there was an evident dampening in 
enthusiasm emanating from l’Elysée, perhaps reflective of the doubts amongst the electorate. 
This was no more evident than in the changing nature of the Franco-German axis. The moteur 
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de l’Europe, as previously represented by the Mitterrand-Kohl partnership, fell on difficult 
times as Chirac and German Chancellor Gerard Schroeder appeared to have very different 
priorities (Boussat 2006, 187-212). In such circumstances, once again, one would have 
assumed that Europe would have an increased bearing in the 2002 Presidential election 
campaign. However, as had been the case in 1995, both in terms of the attention afforded by 
the candidates and polling data on important themes, the expected increase in prominence 
was not forthcoming. The increasing scepticism surrounding the question of Europe was a 
key factor in explaining why ‘avoiding the issue of ‘Europe’ unsurprisingly emerged in the 
2002 elections and an implicit campaign objective of the front-runners.’ (Drake 2003, 6). 
Despite Chirac’s failings over Europe, his overall commitment to the project, juxtaposed with 
increasing doubts, rendered it an obsolete area for gaining political capital for all main 
candidates, thus explaining why it assez peu nourri les débats entre candidats tout au long de 
ce printemps electoral.’ (Belot and Cautrès 2004, 119-41). Such scant coverage 
unsurprisingly impacted on the importance afforded to the European question by the 
electorate, as evidenced in polling data where it continued to languish as a question of 
secondary importance or even as an issue of ‘no significance’ to voters (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau 
and Bélanger 2012, 108-09).2  
When the 2007 election came around, there was good reason to assume that Europe 
would feature as a salient campaign theme. Chirac’s second term in office would be 
dominated by international affairs. Initially, his brave stance on the 2003 Iraq conflict earned 
him plenty of plaudits. However, before too long, he ran into serious difficulties and the issue 
of Europe was significant (Cole, Le Galès and Levy 2008, 1-16). In particular, his 2005 
decision to ratify the new European constitutional treaty via a referendum sparked an intense 
debate on the question of Europe on a scale not experienced since Maastricht. However, this 
time the result was inverted and any hope he had harboured of consolidating his popularity 
through a OUI victory evaporated when the French sensationally voted NON (Dulphy and 
Manigand 2006, 22-46). This result (compounded by subsequent domestic difficulties) served 
to accentuate the significance of the 2007 elections as an opportunity to wipe the slate clean 
and start afresh. Given that Europe had so clearly defined the preceding period combined 
with the sheer intensity of debate, doubt and division as exposed by the referendum 
campaign, it is once again with a certain degree of puzzlement that the theme of Europe 
seemingly figured so little during the 2007 Presidential campaign. The major candidates 
persisted with the approach of the two previous elections whereby the negativity (as exposed 
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by the growing Euroscepticism brought so evidently to light during the referendum debate) 
saw them divert attention away from the problematic European question, instead choosing to 
focus heavily on domestic affairs (Cautrès 2007, 3). Once again, such minimal coverage 
cannot have been without significance on the persistence of Europe as a theme of only 
secondary importance in polling data.3  
In summary, the discrepancy between the importance of Europe and its 
marginalisation in Presidential election campaigns must be understood through the optic of 
widespread growing disenchantment that had seen the emergence of a growing gulf between 
political elites and their general populations (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015, 710-11). 
Such a phenomenon is not exclusive to France, or indeed Europe, and is one that shows no 
sign of abating. However, this alone is insufficient. Explaining why the anticipated post-92 
promotion of Europe as a central election issue did not materialise necessitates a 
consideration of the impact of the transition from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining 
dissensus’. As Hooghe and Marks argue, with increasing public scepticism and deepening 
divisions within mainstream political parties, the elite was forced to look nervously over their 
shoulders when dealing with the European question (5). The upshot in Presidential election 
campaigns was a tendency to avoid any overt discussion of Europe with the obvious impact 
on how this was translated in the opinion polls.   
Table 44 
 Rank in importance 
 1995 2002 2007 
Unemployment 1 1 1 
Education 2 7 4 
Personal security 8 2 7 
Environment 9 6 6 
Immigration 11 4 10 
Europe 13 11 12 
 
Let us now turn our attention to the 2012 election as a game-changer in terms of how the 
European question featured.  
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Presidentials 2012 - game changer 
Nicolas Sarkozy was elected in 2007 on a rupture ticket, vowing to tackle the difficult 
reforms he deemed necessary to help France adapt to the demands of the 21st century global 
economy (Hewlett 2007, 407-10). His hyperpresident approach to reforms such as the 
pension regime combined with his inimitable Presidential style soon led to a crisis in terms of 
his popularity (Cole 2012, 312-14; Gaffney 2012). It was however another crisis that would 
bring the question of Europe into stark focus. Despite declaring that la France est de retour 
en Europe in his election victory speech, and his leading role in overcoming the 2005 setback 
with the renegotiated Lisbon Treaty, it was not until the onset of the global financial crisis of 
2008 that Europe became the central focus of Sarkozy’s presidency. As the crisis gathered 
momentum and threatened the single currency via the Greece debacle, Sarkozy discovered 
the merits of the Franco-German axis and led France to centre stage in helping protect 
Europe’s economy from a complete meltdown (Dimitrakopoulos, Menon, Passas 2009, 451-
65). By the beginning of 2012, the extent of the financial crisis had become clear and it 
inevitably dominated political debates and media coverage up and down the country. Such 
focalisation on the crisis was accentuated further by the President’s calculation that his best 
chance of re-election lay by diverting attention away from his desperately unpopular 
domestic performance and instead focussing on presenting himself as the man that saved the 
Euro from collapse. On the one hand he was able to claim that the unprecedented financial 
meltdown prevented him from achieving all of his goals domestically. On the other he could 
portray himself as a responsible leader who had been at the forefront of helping France and 
Europe face up to the crisis and prepare for the worst consequences it had to offer. His 
strategy was clearly to present himself as the candidate who needed to remain in post in order 
to see through the long-term plan he was responsible for putting in place. 
 
The Campaign – First round 
The campaign for the first round of the 2012 election campaign involved 10 candidates (a 
drop in comparison to 2002 and 2007), 5 of whom inflected the campaign significantly. 
Outgoing President Sarkozy’s official programme Mes Propositions pour une France Forte 
et Juste was a late arrival, was criticised for being light on detail but certainly afforded 
considerable prominence to the question of Europe.5 His campaign tour and public 
appearances saw him consolidate the main points of his policy on Europe – i.e. that Europe 
was of considerable importance for France, that the crisis had exposed the need for change 
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and that he, having played such a central role in rescuing the project, was the best placed 
candidate to continue the job.6 A typical example of Sarkozy’s discourse on Europe came in 
his Récy speech of 15 March when he declared:  
Voilà à quoi nous avons consacré les quatre dernières années ! Maintenant que la 
crise financière est derrière nous, maintenant que nous avons résolu le problème grec 
– et ce n’est pas si simple – je veux vous le dire ici, en nous battant pour les autres 
nous nous sommes battus pour la France, en sauvant les autres nous nous sommes 
sauvés nous-mêmes, et où sont-ils tous ceux qui n’ont cessé de me critiquer 
lorsqu’avec Madame MERKEL nous nous battions pour sauver l’Euro, pour sauver 
l’Europe, pour sauver la Grèce ? Aujourd’hui que la crise financière est derrière 
nous…7  
Francois Hollande launched his campaign much earlier and, in his 60 Engagements pour la 
France, outlined the importance of the European question.8 His campaign speeches and 
appearances saw the PS candidate present himself as the alternative to Sarkozy’s austerity-
driven response to the crisis. He accepted the need for change but refused to accept the 
inevitability of the German-led line, insisting instead on the need for growth as the central 
focus.9 For example, in his Paris speech of 17 March, Hollande declared: 
Nous sommes à un moment crucial, car l’élection présidentielle en France se tient au 
moment même où un nouveau traité est signé. Face à un pacte qui porte le nom de 
stabilité mais qui peut devenir un pacte d’austérité, j’oppose un pacte de 
responsabilité, de gouvernance et de croissance.10 
The Sarkozy/Hollande duel was of course dominant. However, the unlikely clash between 
Jean-Luc Melenchon and Marine Le Pen provided an interesting battle that was not without 
significance and the question of Europe figured heavily. 
The Front National candidate set out her programme in the manifesto entitled Mon 
Projet including the familiar anti-EU rhetoric of her party based around the demand for 
greater sovereignty via a withdrawal from the Eurozone and a renegotiation of all existing 
treaties.11 Such themes punctuated her campaign tour as she insisted on the need to bring 
Europe into the debate more so as to avoid the usual cosy consensus of the mainstream 
elite.12  
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Vous l’avez remarqué en effet, aucun des deux candidats siamois de l’UMP et du PS 
ne traite la question européenne, alors qu’elle engage très largement la France, les 
Français et leur avenir. Non, conscients de leur parfaite ressemblance sur le sujet de 
l’Europe, les siamois de l’UMP et du PS, qui souvenons-nous posaient fièrement 
ensemble en 2005 pour Paris Match afin d’appeler les Français à dire OUI à la 
Constitution de Monsieur Giscard, choisissent délibérément pendant cette campagne 
d’esquiver la question de l’Europe, au profit des coups de communication et des 
annonces sans lendemain, quand ce ne sont pas les noms d’oiseau ou les insultes !13 
Melenchon was equally critical of the European project but for very different reasons. In his 
L’Humain d’abord manifesto, the Front de Gauche candidate set out the need for a new 
direction.14 Interpreting the post-Lisbon Europe as one firmly set on a neo-liberal trajectory, 
he called for France to lead a new, post-crisis era for Europe based on social justice, ecology 
and the need to overcome the existing democratic crisis.15  
Il faut avoir la volonté et ne pas se coucher chaque fois que quelqu'un parle un peu 
fort, ne pas vouloir jouer le bon élève de la classe capitaliste, ne pas céder toutes les 
cinq minutes à Mme Merkel ou à je-ne-sais-qui quand ils font les gros yeux pour 
protéger la rente en Europe. […] Mais en plus nous aurons ouvert la brèche pour 
toute l'Europe car ce sera la première faille dans le dispositif des libéraux, que nous 
aurons réussie. Et après nous votent les grecs. Après nous votent les allemands. Et 
cette brèche s'élargira quand on verra que les français ont commencé à abattre le 
mur, le mur de l'argent !16 
The final candidate of the five front-runners was the centrist Francois Bayrou. This 
stalwart of recent presidential elections reiterated his well-trodden, pro-European stance and 
sought to present himself as the consensual candidate in his La France Solidaire 
programme.17 The manifesto and his campaign outlined his acceptance of how the crisis had 
exposed the frailties of the European project but that the response lay not in scapegoating 
Europe and instead in France leading a strengthening of the project, something it had always 
done and benefitted greatly from.18 
Je veux le dire face à tous les Français qui nous regardent et face au monde qui nous 
regarde, dans cette salle, dans ce grand courant d'opinion, dans ce peuple français 
qui est en train de se former pour son redressement : nous, l'Europe, nous l'aimons ! 
Nous aimons l'Europe parce que nous aimons la France et nous aimons l'Europe du 
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même amour que nous aimons la France, parce que c'est la même chose et le même 
destin. L'Europe est la clef du destin de la France comme la France est la clef du 
destin de l'Europe. Si l'Europe est faible, si l'Europe est vide, alors l'avenir de la 
France sera affaibli.19 
Overall, the first round campaign demonstrated just how significant the European 
question had become for the main candidates. Its prominence in manifestos, campaign 
literature and candidate speeches revealed, both directly and indirectly, how Europe had 
become an unavoidable issue for any serious contenders (Drake 2013, 124-41). It is 
interesting to consider, via a range of opinion polls, just what impact this had on the 
electorate.   
An early Opinionway  poll on 14-15 March 2012 asked respondents to outline the 
themes that would have the greatest influence on their choices in the first round.20 Only 8% 
picked out la Construction Européenne with issues such as Le pouvoir d’achat (43%), 
l’emploi (42%) or l’immigration (21%) ranking higher. A similar question could be found in 
an IPSOS poll of 19-21 April, on the eve of the vote, where respondents were asked to 
identify the three dominant themes that would influence their decision.21 Europe did not even 
figure with similar domestic concerns taking priority. A CSA study conducted on polling day 
22 April included a similar question with results showing how 12% chose the future of the 
Euro to be a significant concern; again, hardly a top priority.22 A TNS SOFRES poll on the 
same day revealed no specific place for the question of Europe with 9% highlighting the 
international situation as important.23 One poll that bucked the evident trend was a Harris 
Interactive study of 22 April where Europe figured much more prominently drawing 20% but 
still lagging behind the usual domestic concerns such as la dette, l’éducation or les impots.24  
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Table 525 
Opinionway IPSOS CSA TNS SOFRES Harris Interactive 
Le pouvoir d'achat 43 Le pouvoir d’achat 46 Le pouvoir d'achat  45 La lutte contre le chômage  50 L’emploi 44 
L'emploi 42 La crise économique et 
financière 
44 L'emploi  38 La réduction de la dette et des 
déficits  
31 La lutte contre les déficits, 
la dette 
38 
La protection 
sociale  
38 Le chômage 30 La dette de l'Etat  30 L'amélioration de l'école et 
l'enseignement  
29 Le pouvoir d’achat 36 
La dette et les 
déficits 
30 Les inégalités sociales 25 Les inégalités sociales  29 L'amélioration du pouvoir 
d'achat  
26 L’éducation et la formation 32 
Les inégalités 
sociales 
25 L’immigration 24 L'immigration  20 Le financement du système de 
protection sociale  
24 La lutte contre les 
inégalités 
30 
L'éducation et la 
formation 
21 Les déficits publics 20 Les retraites  19 La lutte contre les inégalités et 
les injustices  
23 Les impôts, la fiscalité 26 
L'immigration 21 L’insécurité 19 La sécurité des biens et 
des personnes  
17 la lutte contre la pauvreté  18 La moralisation de la vie 
politique 
25 
La sécurité 17 Les retraites 19 L'éducation et la 
recherche  
13 La lutte contre l'insécurité  16 L’immigration 24 
La fiscalité 16 Les impôts et les taxes 17 L'avenir de l'euro  12 La politique fiscale, les impôts 
et les taxes  
15 Les retraites 21 
L'environnement 9 Le fonctionnement du 
système de santé 
17 L'accès aux soins  10 La lutte contre l'immigration 
clandestine  
15 La santé 21 
La construction 
européenne 
8 Le système éducatif 15 La protection de 
l'environnement  
5 La protection de 
l'environnement  
9 L’Europe 20 
La France dans le 
monde 
7 L’environnement 6 L'accès au logement  5 La situation internationale  9 La compétitivité des 
entreprises françaises 
19 
La corruption, les 
affaires 
6 Le fonctionnement de la 
justice 
6 Le nucléaire  2 L'intégration des minorités dans 
la société française  
3 La sécurité des personnes 
et des biens 
18 
La mondialisation 3 L’accès au logement 4 Rien de tout cela 7   La lutte contre les 
délocalisations 
16 
NSP/NR 0 Les inégalités entre 
femmes et hommes 
3     La réforme des institutions 14 
  L’avenir de l’énergie 
nucléaire 
3     La politique étrangère de 
la France 
13 
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Despite a certain degree of variation between the poll outcomes, there is a clear trend 
suggesting that, whilst Europe was certainly something that had some bearing on voter 
choices, the prominence afforded to this question by candidates was not replicated amongst 
the electorate. The first round result contained no real surprises with Sarkozy (27.8%) and 
Hollande (28.63%) progressing to the second round head-to-head (Kuhn 2013).   
 
The Campaign – Second round 
Neither candidate wasted any time getting back on the campaign trail following the first 
round result. On 23 April Hollande was in Brittany and Sarkozy in St. Cyr-Loire. Early 
evidence of the continued prominence of Europe was delivered by the PS candidate in his 
Quimper speech when he declared that he wanted to make l’élection presidentielle du 6 mai 
non pas une éléction nationale mais une éléction européénne.26 He argued that this election 
provided the opportunity for France to set an example for other EU nations where there was 
an equal thirst for a new direction. Sarkozy countered with his insistence on the continuation 
of his successful approach. The impact of the strong first round FN vote was clear to see in 
the outgoing President’s tough rhetoric recognising that Europe was increasingly perceived as 
connected to difficulties over the economy and immigration. For example: 
Je veux m’adresser à ceux dont on méprise la douleur, à tous ceux auxquels on ne 
donne jamais la parole, parce que, au fond, on ne veut pas entendre leurs plaintes. A 
tous ceux qui ne supportent plus le déni de souffrance dont ils se sentent victimes, à 
tous ceux qui en ont assez d’entendre que l’insécurité n’est pas une réalité, que 
l’immigration, ce n’est pas un sujet. Le nombre d’insultes, d’injures que j’ai dû 
supporter parce que j’ai osé poser la question de l’immigration, c’est un scandale !27  
Despite calls for more than the one televised debate scheduled for 2 May, the only 
other time the two candidates would share a television platform was for a special edition of 
Des paroles et des actes on 26 April.28 However, instead of a conventional head-to-head 
debate, both appeared separately for a strictly-regulated 35 minutes each. A wide range of 
issues were covered, including Europe. Hollande called into question the liberal, 
deregulationist approach of the EU and was highly critical of the “Merkozy”-led austerity 
response to the crisis. Sarkozy also focussed heavily on Europe and countered Hollande’s 
negative assessment of his European policy claiming that his record and approach was and 
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would continue to be successful. Only through a continuation of his line, he argued, would 
France truly experience the growth his competitor was so keen on. 
Beyond the polemical debate around the ownership of 1 May, la fete du travail 
provided a high profile opportunity for both candidates (and Marine le Pen) to address the 
nation (Leveque 2012). Hollande attended a meeting in Nevers to mark this important date 
and commemorate the passing of Pierre Bérégovoy. He made much of the past, including that 
of the former Prime Minister and Francois Mitterrand, and in particular the long-held pro-
Europeanism of his party: 
Je suis européen. François Mitterrand nous a montré la voie. Pierre Bérégovoy a 
éclairé le passage. Je suis européen parce que je pense que dans un contexte comme 
nous le connaissons, la crise qui frappe, notre Europe peut être le levier, la solution 
— sauf si elle se condamne à l’austérité, ce que le candidat sortant a choisi comme 
orientation avec la chancelière d’Allemagne.29 
He hammered home the point that his victory would provide a much sought example for 
other EU nations seeking an alternative to austerity. Sarkozy held a huge rally at the 
Trocadero in Paris where, whilst re-affirming his pro-European credentials, he highlighted 
the increasing fears attached to the project and in particular the perceived detrimental impact 
on French workers. The solution he argued lay with the borders – Europe’s external borders 
as well as those within: 
Il faut des frontières à l’Europe. Il faut des frontières à la France. Non pour 
s’enfermer, mais pour s’affirmer dans le monde. Pour clarifier les rapports avec les 
autres. La frontière, c’est le droit opposé à la force. C’est la règle opposée au 
désordre. C’est la régulation au lieu du laisser-faire. Les frontières, cela peut 
paraître loin des préoccupations quotidiennes de ceux qui se lèvent tôt et qui 
travaillent dur.30   
The now traditional, and arguably pivotal, TV debate between the candidates took 
place on 2 May and, unsurprisingly, the marathon 3-hour session saw a broad range of issues 
discussed.31 There was no direct discussion of the European question. However, its 
importance in transcending a number of issues was evident throughout. Whilst the pro-
European stance of both candidates may help explain why it did not feature more specifically, 
that is not say there were no differences on the subject. Inevitably, the crisis brought the 
discussion on Europe to the table. The now familiar pattern of Sarkozy defending his 
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approach thus far and the need for it to continue countered by Hollande arguing that the time 
had come for a new European direction was in evidence.  
Both candidates brought their campaigns to a close on 3 May with speeches in Toulon 
(Sarkozy) and Toulon (Hollande). Unsurprisingly, the familiar lines on Europe were 
maintained and remained prominent in both camps. The outgoing President sought to remind 
the electorate of his central role in steering France and Europe through the crisis. 
La France n’a pas été emportée comme tant d’autres pays comme un fétu de paille 
par la crise. Nous avons tenu. Nous avons pris les mesures, les mesures qui 
s’imposaient face à l’urgence […] les réformes qui nous ont évité de connaitre 
l’humiliation que connait aujourd’hui la Grèce, les souffrances que connait l’Italie et 
le Portugal et aujourd’hui les affres que connait l’Espagne.32 
He argued that changing the President would lead to an absurd, new direction and inevitable 
disaster: Deux jours de mensonges, et des années pour régler la facture, voilà 
le projet socialiste. The PS candidate consolidated his discourse on how he had given some 
credibility to the idea of an alternative approach for Europe. He argued that something 
considered impossible was now perfectly possible and even desirable. His victory, he argued, 
would be a victory not just for France but also for Europe. 
Le devoir qui est le nôtre, la responsabilité qui est la mienne, c’est que la victoire du 
6 mai soit ressentie partout en Europe comme un moment d’espoir, comme un 
moment de confiance, de redressement possible. Je reçois des messages de la Grèce, 
du Portugal, de l’Espagne de l’Italie, partout où ils nous disent : « Surtout ne laissez 
pas passer votre chance, vous, peuple français, permettez l’alternance pas 
simplement en France mais dans toute l’Europe ! ». Nous avons un devoir de 
victoire.33 
The first round trend that saw candidates afford significant importance to the 
European question clearly continued into round two. To establish whether or not this was 
replicated amongst the electorate one can turn to a range of opinion poll results. Two word 
clouds were produced on the results of the following question posed in a 6 May Harris 
Interactive Poll: Quelles sont toutes les raisons pour lesquelles vous avez vote pour Nicolas 
Sarkozy/Francois Hollande?34 
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Hollande voters 
 
 
Sarkozy voters 
 
On first view, it would appear that Europe remained very much a secondary concern for both 
Sarkozy and Hollande supporters. Nevertheless, that it featured at all could lend weight to the 
assessment that Europe was beginning to emerge as a more significant area of concern, 
interestingly more so for those having voted Sarkozy. Another voting day poll by 
Opinionway asked respondents to identify the questions that counted most in their second 
round choices.35 La Construction Européenne garnered a significant 21% but still lagged 
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behind the same domestic issues given priority in round one. A TNS Sofres poll on the same 
day presented results to a very similar question where Europe was not even mentioned and la 
Situation Internationale received on 10%.36 Such an absence for Europe was identifiable in 
an IPSOS rolling poll in the period leading up to the second round vote.37 Respondents were 
asked to identify 3 areas that concerned them most from a personal perspective and also for 
France more generally. Neither set of results received any explicit reference to Europe .
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Table 638 
Opinionway TNS Sofres IPSOS (pour la France) IPSOS (personnellement) 
L’emploi 50 La lutte contre le chômage 49 La crise économique 
financière 
56 Le pouvoir d’achat 61 
Le pouvoir d’achat 48 La réduction de la dette et des déficits 36 Le chômage 47 Les retraites 35 
La dette et les déficits 47 L'amélioration de l'école et 
l'enseignement 
32 Les déficits publics 36 Les impôts et les taxes 31 
La protection sociale 46 L'amélioration du pouvoir d'achat 29 Le pouvoir d’achat 29 Le fonctionnement du 
système de santé 
23 
Les inégalités sociales 35 Le financement du système de protection 
sociale (retraites, santé…) 
28 L’immigration 24 La crise économique 
financière 
23 
L’éducation et la formation 34 La lutte contre les inégalités et les 
injustices 
23 Les inégalités sociales 17 Le chômage 21 
L’immigration 34 La lutte contre la pauvreté 18 Le système éducatif 15 Le système éducatif 16 
Le rôle de la France dans le 
monde 
27 La lutte contre l'immigration clandestine 17 L’insécurité 15 L’insécurité 16 
La sécurité 25 La lutte contre l'insécurité 15 Le fonctionnement du système 
de santé 
13 Les inégalités sociales 14 
La fiscalité 24 La politique fiscale, les impôts et les 
taxes 
15 Les impôts et les taxes 12 L’immigration 13 
La construction européenne 21 La situation internationale 10 Les retraites 10 Les déficits publics 9 
La corruption, les affaires 20 La protection de l'environnement 7 Le fonctionnement de la 
justice 
6 L’environnement 8 
L’environnement 13 L'intégration des minorités dans la 
société française 
6 L’accès au logement 5 L’accès au logement 7 
La mondialisation 9 Sans réponse 1 L’environnement 4 Le fonctionnement de la 
justice 
5 
Aucun de ceux la  5   L’avenir de l’énergie 
nucléaire 
3 Les inégalités entre 
femmes et hommes 
3 
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On the surface it would appear that Europe was not of any serious concern to the 
French electorate in 2012. There certainly appears to have been a significant gap between the 
electorate and the main candidates in relation to the question of Europe and its importance. 
This ambiguity helps explain Drake’s analysis of the European issue being ‘everywhere and 
nowhere’ during the campaign (Drake 2013). The following section provides an explanation 
for this paradoxical set of circumstances and explains why 2012 should nevertheless be 
considered a game-changer in relation to this question.  
 
Making sense 
The first point to make relates to the fact that in all Presidential elections prior to, and 
including, 2012, polling data has revealed Europe to be little more than a secondary 
consideration for the electorate. It is undeniable that Europe has consistently featured well 
down the list of declared priorities. However, one must be careful not to draw over-simplistic 
conclusions. Whilst it may well be the case that Europe has not featured in explicit terms, it is 
impossible to dissociate those themes that have been most prominent from the question of 
Europe. As the years have passed and the European project has progressed, it has become an 
undeniably prominent feature in the way in which France functions (Schmidt 2007, 995-98). 
However, Europe is not something that exists outside France, it is stitched into the very fabric 
of how it works and importantly how France views itself. This relationship with Europe as 
somewhat of a fait accompli has been reinforced by the dominant political discourse which 
can be traced back as far as Francois Mitterrand’s 1983 volte-face. When he then declared in 
1987 that la France est notre patrie et l’Europe notre avenir, France signalled its choice to 
henceforth follow a very strong pro-European trajectory and from that point on everyone 
seemingly bought into the project (Boussat 182). So central has Europe become since then 
that it could argued as more of a domestic than a foreign policy issue (Rowdybush and 
Chamorel 2011, 170). The fact that it is viewed in this manner goes some way towards 
explaining how and why it has never really featured explicitly as a separate issue of 
importance for the electorate, as borne out by the polling data. The counter-intuitive 
consequence that has seen the increased salience of Europe find no replication in its 
perceived prominence as a principle concern for the electorate (Dehousse and Tacea, 152) 
can in part be explained by the fact that its significance has been hidden by the conflation 
between Europe and key domestic issues such as unemployment, economy, immigration, etc. 
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As demonstrated above, 2012 did not reveal any significant shift in polling data, with Europe 
continuing in its position of secondary importance. Nothing then, it could be argued, sets 
2012 apart. For the voting public, Europe remained ‘the elephant in the room’. The real and 
significant change concerns the manner with which this issue was handled by the Presidential 
candidates.  
Prior to 2012, the question of Europe was not one that featured prominently in the 
campaigns of major candidates. Recognising the mounting scepticism towards Europe 
alongside the seemingly immovable French commitment to the project, no Presidential 
candidates saw any real value in prioritising it in their campaigns. Instead, and central to 
maintaining the ‘elephant in the room’ status, the ‘constraining dissensus’ era saw 
mainstream parties continue to ‘resist politicising the issue’ (Hooghe and Marks, 21). This is 
where 2012 becomes the game-changer. If the previous three elections saw Europe dodged or 
avoided, it is impossible to draw the same conclusion in 2012. In fact, as argued by Dehousse 
and Tacea, it would be reasonable to discuss the 2012 presidential campaign as having been 
‘Europeanised’ with this issue a consistently important theme right across the political 
spectrum (2015, 155). 
Central to understanding the reasons behind this shift is the impact of the global 
financial crisis of 2008. However, it is first of all important to map out the context within 
which this crisis struck as it is one where Europe had already started to emerge as a 
prominent concern. Upon his election in 2007, Sarkozy was unambiguous in outlining his 
determination to make Europe a priority. In a bid to overcome what he perceived as the 
setbacks of the Chirac era, he set out to re-establish France’s place as a leader of the 
European project. This Europeanisation of the French presidency was in full evidence in 
Sarkozy’s central role in the process leading to the Lisbon treaty which essentially sought to 
make up for the damage cause by the French 2005 NON vote (Dehousse and Menon 2009, 
100-101). Sarkozy’s prioritisation of Europe therefore pre-dated the onset of the financial 
crisis but it was unquestionably accentuated as a result. When the subprime crisis hit the 
world economy in 2007-2008, the impact on France was, to a certain extent, underestimated. 
In the early stages, there was even some suggestion that the structure of the French economy 
(previously lamented by Sarkozy) could somehow shelter France from the worst of what was 
to come (de la Brosse 2009). However, as the full impact unfolded, it became clear that 
France would not be spared and the 2008-12 period was one that saw the crisis inevitably 
dominate public and political debates (Hewlett 2012). The multiple and interconnected 
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consequences of the exceptional context lie at the heart of explaining why the 2012 
Presidential elections can be described as a game-changer for the European question.  
Firstly, it would be no longer possible for Europe to be the ‘elephant in the room’ 
issue. How could a Presidential campaign in 2012 hope to relegate Europe to a secondary 
issue when the economic crisis had effectively monopolised political and media debates and 
thus brought the question of Europe to everyone’s attention? (Lequesne 2012; Dehousse and 
Tacea 2013, 6). Secondly, Sarkozy’s response to focus all of his attentions on helping save 
the Euro alongside Angela Merkel in the latter stages of his mandate meant that one of the 
principal candidates had effectively put all his eggs in the European basket and was intent in 
making as much political capital from the issue as possible. Thirdly, the long-held, 
mainstream discourse that Europe was a positive for France – under pressure for some time 
(Kramer 2006, 126-38; Rozenberg 2011, Rozenberg 2015) – became an extremely difficult 
line to toe in the wake of the financial crisis. As the Euro emerged as the greatest victim of 
the depression, the feeling spread that France was being further dragged into the mire as a 
result. This was pounced upon by eurosceptics and in particular the FN who sought to exploit 
the crisis and place it front and centre in their own campaign.39 The central argument that 
Europe could be a shield to protect France from the vicissitudes of globalisation became a 
very difficult one to support when this US-born crisis stood to cripple the French economy 
(for some) because of French membership of the EU.40 The context of the crisis therefore 
forced the ‘constraining dissensus’ onto the Presidential election agenda. As a result, the 
debate over Europe was no longer the preserve of extreme, populist parties on the Left and 
Right and mainstream candidates were left with little choice but to engage with Europe as a 
central issue. The fourth and final point relates to the subsequent breakdown in the ‘rhetoric 
of unanimity’. The hitherto dominant consensus between the mainstream candidates over the 
advancement and direction of the European project that had been so central during the eras of 
the ‘permissive consensus’ and ‘constraining dissensus’ also broke down as a result of the 
crisis. The two main candidates, whilst both adamant pro-Europeans, argued for two very 
different responses to the crisis. On the one hand, Sarkozy insisted on the continuity of his 
austerity-driven programme whereas Hollande called for a new anti-austerity direction 
focused on growth. Such differentiation meant that for the first time there was some political 
capital to be gained in both camps in making more of Europe as a key election theme.  
Prior to 2012, the evasive approach of Presidential candidates that had seen Europe 
pushed to the margins of campaign debates reflected the ‘silent Europeanisation’ experienced 
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in France in spite of mounting fears, doubts and opposition (Rozenberg 2011(b), 11). 
However, in the run-up to the 2012 campaign, a number of factors converged to ensure that 
any hope of Europe continuing as an unspoken issue would be impossible. The build-up in 
tension finally broke through as a result of the convergence between Sarkozy’s Europeanised 
Presidency and the onset of the financial crisis. The subsequent prioritisation of Europe and 
its now flagrant and undeniable importance to, and influence on, domestic, French issues 
meant that it was no longer possible for it to be relegated to an issue of secondary importance.  
 
Conclusion 
The shift in election campaign coverage afforded to the issue of Europe in 2012 is important 
in signalling an irreversible change in how it will feature in future Presidential elections, 
starting in 2017. With Europe now placed as a central concern for candidates, the proverbial 
cat has been let out of the bag and it is difficult to see how this can be undone. Furthermore, it 
was argued earlier that a number of convergent factors came together to essentially force 
candidates to move away from the evasive treatment of the European question that hitherto 
had been so dominant. Central to such concerns were the shifting contextual circumstances of 
the financial crisis that made it virtually impossible to push any consideration of Europe’s 
influence or importance to the margins of the campaign debate. Given the events of the 2012-
17 period – the migrant crisis, the threat of terrorism, ongoing economic difficulties, the 
Brexit controversy, Hollande’s failure to deliver on his anti-austerity rhetoric and the growing 
support for the FN and its Eurosceptic stance –, it is obvious that Europe will remain an area 
of unavoidable and principal concern for all candidates in the 2017 Presidential elections. 
One only has to consider the attention afforded to the European question in the all-important 
primaries on the Left and the Right as an early indicator of just how significant Europe has 
become and will continue to be.41 The increased salience as dictated by recent contextual 
developments will not be without consequence on the priorities of the electorate. Whilst it is 
unlikely to bypass the traditional dominant concerns (unemployment, spending power and 
immigration), there is a distinct possibility that Europe as an explicit (as well as implicit) 
theme of concern will feature much more prominently in the list of priorities determining 
voters’ choices in 2017. This will undoubtedly force candidates to afford Europe even more 
attention. Such a symbiotic process will see Europe progressively become increasingly 
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important as an electoral issue rendering its days as the ‘elephant in the room’ very much a 
thing of the past.       
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